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ABSTRACT
Political acceptability is an essential issue in choosing appropriate climate policies.
Sociologists and behavioural scientists recognize the importance of selecting
environmental policies that have broad political support, while economists tend to
compare diﬀerent instruments ﬁrst on the basis of their eﬃciency, and then by
assessing their distributional impacts and thus their political acceptability. This
paper examines case-study and empirical evidence that the job losses ascribed
(correctly or incorrectly) to climate policies have substantial impacts on the
willingness of aﬀected workers to support these policies. In aggregate, the costs of
these losses are signiﬁcantly smaller than the beneﬁts, both in terms of health and,
probably, of labour market outcomes, but the losses are concentrated in speciﬁc
areas, sectors and social groups that have been hit hard by the great recession and
international competition. Localized contextual eﬀects, such as peer group pressure,
and politico-economic factors, such as weakened unions and tightened government
budgets, amplify the strength and the persistence of the ‘job-killing’ argument.
Compensating for the eﬀects of climate policies on ‘left-behind’ workers appears to
be the key priority to increase the political acceptability of such policies, but the
design of compensatory policies poses serious challenges.
Key policy insights
. Public perception of, and support for, climate policies is substantially reduced in the
presence of large negative shocks, especially job losses.
. Climate policies can be perceived as negative for employment, especially in areas
where polluting industries represent a large share of employment and in
occupations and sectors already damaged by globalization and automation.
. Policymakers should distinguish between small and large distributional eﬀects of
climate policies, and ﬁnd the appropriate combination of revenue recycling
schemes, industrial and retraining policies as well as compensation packages to
increase the support for such policies.
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1. Introduction
Claiming that regulation will lead to job losses is a compelling argument put forward by energy-intensive indus-
tries to undermine the political acceptability of unilateral climate policies (e.g. Coglianese, Finkel, & Carrigan,
2014; Morgenstern, Pizer, & Shih, 2002). The exit of the US from the Paris Agreement is just the most recent
symptom of a political choice justiﬁed by the need to defend the jobs of coal miners and blue-collar workers
in energy-intensive sectors. Concern for job losses resonates also in the text of the Paris Agreement, which expli-
citly mentions, in its preamble, the need for a ‘just transition of the workforce’, presumably referring to workers
displaced by climate policies in polluting industries.
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This attention towards job losses may appear excessive at ﬁrst glance, given widespread agreement that the
aggregate welfare beneﬁts of environmental policies largely exceed the costs of job losses for exposed indus-
tries and occupations (e.g. Smith, 2015). Computable general equilibrium, post-Keynesian and input-output
models all show that the jobs destroyed in energy-intensive industries are likely to be oﬀset (or more than
oﬀset) by new well-paid jobs in green industries, such as renewable energy, building retroﬁtting, waste manage-
ment and pollution abatement (Barker, Alexandri, Mercure, Ogawa, & Pollitt, 2016; Hafstead & Williams, 2018;
Pollitt, Alexandri, Chewpreecha, & Klaassen, 2015; Wei, Patadia, & Kammen, 2010). A successful relocation
from ‘brown’ to ‘green’ jobs can, however, be particularly diﬃcult given the potentially large diﬀerences in
their skill requirements (Vona, Marin, Consoli, & Popp, 2018a). Walker (2013) ﬁnds that the permanent earnings
losses for workers displaced by the US Clean Air Act can be very large, especially for those who change indus-
tries. Taken together, this evidence suggests that, although the aggregate eﬀect of climate policies is unques-
tionably positive in terms of health and probably neutral in terms of employment, losses for displaced workers in
polluting industries can be large.
This policy analysis discusses the extent to which extreme distributional eﬀects, either in terms of long-term
unemployed or permanent earnings losses, may undermine the political acceptability of climate policies, even
in the presence of negligible aggregate employment and competitiveness eﬀects (Dechezleprêtre & Sato,
2017). In light of solid empirical evidence showing that a unilateral climate policy costs jobs in polluting indus-
tries (e.g. Greenstone, 2002; Walker, 2011) and induces a relocation of economic activities toward regions
(within a country) and countries (globally) with laxer environmental policies (Kahn & Mansur, 2013; Mulatu,
Gerlagh, Rigby, & Wossink, 2010), costs and beneﬁts of such policies are unevenly distributed. A large majority
of modest winners coexists with a tiny fraction of big losers, basically those that lose their job in polluting
industries. That is, we are in the presence of a classic collective action problem because agents that are mod-
estly winning are unlikely to get organized to support climate policies, while the losers have everything at
stake if the policy is approved. While collective action theory (Olson, 1965) is the natural starting point to
analyse the political consequences of extreme distributional eﬀects, this paper discusses a number of amplify-
ing factors that can fuel widespread discontent against climate policies, especially in regions that are hit hard
by other shocks (e.g. globalization) and appear to be abandoned by central governments facing increasingly
tight budget constraints. The paper also discusses the eﬀectiveness of policy solutions including retraining,
worker compensation packages and active green policies, as well as the general issue of whether combatting
climate change can be eﬀective in a world with an increasing fraction of people ‘left behind’ in wealthy
societies.
2. Green preferences vs. jobs and earnings
This paper discusses under what circumstances a conﬂict between green preferences and economic goals, such
as jobs and earnings, can emerge. As starting point, it is useful to think of individuals as socio-economic actors
that play multiple roles associated with multiple types of interactions with the natural environment. In particular,
they are consumers and workers as well as, under certain conditions, voters, and ‘green’ or ‘brown’ political acti-
vists. Their environmentally-related choices in each of these roles are obviously driven by the complex interplay
of both economic and non-economic (mostly behavioural and cultural) factors, provided that individuals are
bounded rational actors embedded in a social context and endowed with inherited beliefs.
Among the main socio-cultural and behavioural drivers, which are discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g. Lee,
Markowitz, Howe, Ko, & Leiserowitz, 2015), intrinsic values (e.g. ethical considerations, intergenerational equity),
inaccurate perceptions of health impacts and behavioural inertia contribute to explaining, for instance, the
energy eﬃciency gap, i.e. the unexploited win-win opportunities to reduce energy consumption without
decreasing individual welfare (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). Contextual factors, such as social norms, infor-
mation diﬀusion and peer eﬀects, are also very important in inﬂuencing the political acceptability of climate pol-
icies (Carattini, Baranzini, Thalmann, Varone, & Vöhringer, 2017; Drews & Van den Bergh, 2016). Recent research
has shown that imitation eﬀects, namely the natural human propensity to replicate the behaviour of friends and
neighbourhoods, increased the political acceptability of both feed-in tariﬀs and solar rooftop PV panels in
Germany and California (Bollinger & Gillingham, 2012; Comin & Rode, 2013; Rode & Weber, 2016), while
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social comparisons are found to aﬀect the adoption of energy-eﬃcient behaviours or mitigation practices
(Allcott, 2011; Biel & Thøgersen, 2007).
Economic drivers of green preferences can be conveniently classiﬁed depending on their size and concen-
tration. As consumers, individuals are aﬀected by climate policies that alter the relative prices of goods with
diﬀerent carbon intensities. Empirical evidence on the environmental Kuznets curve shows that green prefer-
ences emerge once basic needs are satisﬁed, revealing that green preferences are lower in the priority scale
(Dinda, 2004; Vona & Patriarca, 2011). Unless the health eﬀects of climate change are easily understandable,
veriﬁable and perceived to be large, poorer households are unlikely to be willing to support policies that, at
least in the medium-term, increase the cost of energy inputs. Notice that, because it is more likely that
poorer households are less educated, they may have limited knowledge of the health eﬀects of climate
change, thus amplifying the eﬀect of wealth on green preferences. On the other hand, however, it is also
less likely that small distributional impacts, such as those associated with changes in the relative prices of
‘brown’ and ‘green’ goods, will emerge into clear opposition to climate policies. Indeed, environmental policies
represent a secondary component of a broader political package and are bundled together with other policies
that may or may not favour poorer households. For instance, a political party that proposes a carbon tax and an
increase in tax progressivity can be voted for by less-advantaged households on the basis of the small distribu-
tional eﬀects of the climate policy. Because of policies’ bundling, small distributional eﬀects become almost irre-
levant for the political acceptability of climate policies compared to socio-cultural and behavioural factors and
large distributional eﬀects, notably job losses.
To quantify potential large losers of on-going and planned climate policies, Figure 1 plots the evolution in the
share of workers exposed to climate policies over the total workforce in selected countries divided into four
groups (i.e. Western Europe, Eastern Europe, BRICS1, non-EU OECD countries). The exposed workers are
deﬁned as (see the caption in Figure 1 for details): (i) working in a polluting industry; and (ii) having low or
medium educational attainments. Indeed, unskilled workers including high-school graduates are also
exposed to other negative shocks such as automation and trade (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011; Autor, Dorn,
Figure 1. Evolution of vulnerable workers in highly polluting industries share of hours worked on total hours.
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Hanson, & Song, 2014) and thus, after losing their jobs in a polluting industry, are unlikely to ﬁnd an equivalent
job in terms of pay, career development and occupational prestige.2 The most likely outcome is to be re-
employed in a low-skilled service job at the bottom end of the wage distribution. The Figure shows the fraction
of aﬀected workers declining over time and almost everywhere, but it is still in the range between 2.9% and 3.1%
(in Demark, France, Brazil and the US) and 8.2–8.6% (in Czech Republic and China). A recent study by Marin and
Vona (2018) ﬁnds that the decline of employment in EU polluting industries occurred before the implementation
of environmental regulations, thus it is most likely to be a result of globalization and automation. However, this
study also ﬁnds that environmental policies reduced the employment share of blue-collar workers. Overall, the
increased vulnerability of ‘left-behind’ workers distorts their perception regarding the impact of environmental
policies on jobs, and lays a fertile ground for the ‘job-killing’ argument, cementing an unlikely alliance between
unions and industrial lobbies.
3. The political consequences of job losses: case studies
In this section, the paper explores how the ‘job-killing’ argument and the associated collective action problem
translate into a ‘chilling eﬀect’ on the stringency of climate policies, namely the setting of an environmental
regulation less stringent than the social optimum, which goes beyond the expected and well-documented reac-
tions of brown industrial lobbies. First, the 2008 global recession can be seen as a ‘natural experiment’ in how
priorities change in the presence of destructive economic shocks. In the US, Kahn and Kotchen (2011) showed
that an increase in state unemployment rates decreased the incidence of Google internet searches for ‘global
warming’, a proxy of public concern for climate change, and increased those for ‘unemployment’, especially so in
Republican states. Scruggs and Benegal (2012) used a panel of public opinion surveys in the US and EU to show
that concern for climate change dramatically declined after the 2008 recession. Clearly, the great recession rep-
resented a sharp discontinuity in the way people rank priorities. In normal times socio-cultural and behavioural
drivers are extremely important, if not more important, than economic factors; conversely, in the presence of
large negative income shocks, people’s concerns for jobs dominate over their concerns for climate change.
The second evidence on the politico-economic consequences of job and competitiveness losses can be
found in the widespread policy exemptions and laxer regulation enjoyed by polluting industries that should
be the target of such policies, both in Europe and in the US (Ekins & Speck, 1999; Martin, Muûls, De Preux, &
Wagner, 2014; Stavins, 2003; Ward & Cao, 2012). With regard to the EU-Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS),
for instance, research shows that the risk of industrial relocation is not enough to justify the free allocation of
emissions permits and generous policy exemptions for trade-exposed, energy-intensive sectors (Joltreau & Som-
merfeld, 2018; Martin et al., 2014).3 Not only brown industrial lobbies used the ‘job-killing’ argument to contrast
climate policies ensuring generous exemptions to polluting industries, but concerns about the risk of job losses
in speciﬁc industries have been also expressed by institutional actors, unions and local communities. One of the
most echoed cases in the media has been that of the giant steel factory of Taranto (Southern Italy), the so-called
ILVA, which over time has caused sizeable health damages to the local population (The Economist, 2012).
Although the ILVA repeatedly violated environmental and health regulations, in 2012, the Italian government
passed a decree that allowed it to continue production without a credible engagement to reduce emissions.
In 2013, the decree was declared legitimate by the Italian constitutional court on basis of the absolute necessity
to preserve jobs in a region hit hard by the 2008 crisis (Pascucci, 2014).
There are other cases of exemptions from environmental regulations justiﬁed by the risk of job losses and
shared by unions and local communities (Galgóczi, 2014). In France, unions played a key role in postponing
the shutdown of ﬁve coal power plants (Le Monde, 2018), while in Poland, coal is still subsidized (Caldecott,
Sartor, & Spencer, 2017) and, in Sweden, polluting industries pay a reduced carbon tax (OECD, 2014).4 These
cases suggest that the chilling of environmental regulation also depends on the public acceptability of
climate policies in areas where both costs and beneﬁts are concentrated. In Dunkirk (France), where large
steel and petrochemical ﬁrms are located, Le Blanc and Zwarterook (2014) show that health risks are not
seen as a priority by the local population and that economic development and defending jobs are instead recog-
nized as the key priorities.
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What clearly emerges from these cases is that job creation has a priority over health also for the same people
whose health is most aﬀected by polluting activities. Moreover, the geographical concentration of job losses
may strongly undermine the political acceptability of climate policies.
However, with the exception of Cragg, Zhou, Gurney, and Kahn (2013) for the US, there is still scant direct
evidence of the political choices of local communities that may be aﬀected by climate policies in terms of
job losses. In line with the ﬁndings of the above case studies, these authors show that US congressional repre-
sentatives from carbon-intensive and poorer areas have a lower probability of voting in favour of legislation to
regulate carbon. Taking stock of these ﬁndings, it seems that the perceived negative eﬀect of regulation on jobs
shapes the electors’ preferences, especially in most vulnerable regions where job opportunities in other sectors
are absent or unattractive. Although, to the author’s knowledge, there is no evidence for other countries, an
analogy can be made with trade liberalization. Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2016) for the US, and Colantone
and Stanig (2017) for EU countries, ﬁnd that an increase in regional exposure to Chinese competition increases
extreme right-wing and nationalistic positions. This result bears relevance for climate policies because manufac-
turing jobs disappeared not only in ‘light’ industries, such as textiles and apparel, but also in the dirtier segments
of equipment manufacturing, metals and chemicals. Globalization is thus, not surprisingly, the key ampliﬁer fuel-
ling hostility against climate policies; the next section discusses this and other ampliﬁers in greater detail.5
4. Ampliﬁers of the ‘job-killing’ argument
The ﬁnancial crisis and the increase of international competition from China are two fundamental factors that, by
increasing pressure on local labour markets, may amplify the penetration of the ‘job-killing’ argument in aﬀected
communities. As mentioned in the previous section, a key related aspect is the spatial distribution of the impact
of climate policies, which is likely to be highly concentrated as polluting industries tend to co-locate in the same
area (e.g. steel and coal). As a result, regions hosting polluting industries may lack the required options for diver-
siﬁcation to transform climate policies from a constraint into an opportunity.6 Not surprisingly, Rosés and Wolf
(2018) show that regions with a higher proportion of energy-intensive industries and mining have been the
main losers from European deindustrialization during the twentieth century.
Geographical concentration of losers can amplify political opposition against climate policies thorough the
behavioural channels mentioned in Section 2. Indeed, the likelihood of interacting with a worker who has been
negatively aﬀected by globalization or environmental regulations is higher in disadvantaged communities.
Because social interactions nourish political beliefs as well as consumer preferences, segregated societies will
exacerbate collective action problems through peer eﬀects. Group identity also acts as an ampliﬁer insofar
as, at least in the US, brown jobs tend to be dominated by white males—a group heavily exposed to trade
shocks (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2017). Further research is required to understand the role of group identity
and peer eﬀects in amplifying the support for or against climate policies.
Several political factors contribute to amplifying the ‘job-killing’ discourse, besides those related to the per-
sistence of political constituencies and lobbying. These factors range from the widespread weakening of unions
and of workers’ bargaining power, which has led to the quantity of jobs increasingly taking priority over their
quality (including health and environmental conditions) in industrial relations7 – to capital mobility and the
erosion of the tax base – which has tightened government budgets and reduced the generosity of compen-
sation schemes. As the demand for social protection from most vulnerable citizens has increased, trade and
environmental policies became the natural substitutes for social policies (Colantone & Stanig, 2017). As a
result, populistic political platforms, which are increasingly supported by former blue-collar workers, have
bundled an anti-globalization discourse together with proposals to repeal ‘job-killing’ environmental regu-
lations. However, because trade policies are diﬃcult to overturn unilaterally (Nordhaus, 2015)8, environmental
regulations are an easier target to satisfy the increased demand for protection, further amplifying the ‘job-
killing’ argument.
The distance between the skill requirements of brown and alternative jobs in the local labour market is
another discriminant factor that, through the set of potential opportunities for displaced workers, aﬀects the
political acceptability of climate policies. In the Ruhr region in Germany, for instance, local competences in
mining technologies were suitable for use in renewable energy production and recycling technologies.9 This
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may not be the case in regions with less eﬃcient retraining facilities and weaker skill bases than the Ruhr. While
coal mines in the Netherlands represent another example of successful labour market transition, in Poland,
miners faced considerable diﬃculties to be reemployed in an equivalent job (Caldecott et al., 2017).10 It is
not only skill gaps that are important, but also the average quality of the non-brown jobs available in the
local economy. Recently, at least in the US, an element of concern has been that the average job quality has
decreased with an increasing share of educated workers ending up in low-paid service sector jobs (Beaudry,
Green, & Sand, 2016).
Obviously, not all factors go in favour of the ‘job-killing’ political constituency. The main compensating factor
is that climate policies also create winners, namely, ﬁrms and workers in emerging green sectors that can
organize and combat the brown political constituency. However, there is a fundamental asymmetry between
brown losers, who tend to be low-skilled individuals with few outside opportunities, and green winners, who,
as shown by Vona et al. (2018a), seem to be mostly high-skilled workers with plenty of outside opportunities.
The extent to which this asymmetry translates into a diﬀerent degree of eﬀective political participation and acti-
vism remains an open issue that requires further investigation. Other mitigating factors can be the result of
clever policy choices that will be discussed in the concluding section.
5. Conclusions
The extreme forms of discontent created by climate policies are a gift to the true vested interests defending the
status quo of lax carbon regulations: the companies in heavily polluting sectors. The ‘job-killing’ argument is just
a weapon in the basket of brown lobbies, although, as argued in this paper, it is certainly one of the most impor-
tant. A pragmatic approach to climate policy should consider, as a priority, implementing countervailing policies
to minimize the collective action problem associated with extremely negative economic shocks.
A main issue for an eﬀective design of these countervailing policies is whether subsidies should be chan-
nelled to displaced workers or to build comparative advantages in new sectors. If the choice is mainly to transfer
money to displaced workers, the comparison of the cases of the Ruhr and of Netherland mines with that of
Polish mines suggests that redundancy payments are very important but should not be exceedingly long,
and should be combined with retraining policies. As a recent choice experiment survey has shown (Carattini
et al., 2017), lump-sum transfers to aﬀected workers and communities are probably the best way to increase
the political acceptability of climate policies (see also Sverker, Martinsson, & Matti, 2018).
If the choice is mainly to invest in other sectors that can absorb workers displaced from polluting ones, the
revenues of a carbon tax can be used in two ways. First, they can ﬁnance industrial policies, including workers’
retraining, in support of the green economy (Fankhauser, Sehlleier, & Stern, 2008). However, this approach may
not suﬃce if specialization in greener production is speciﬁc to certain locations, and thus diﬃcult to transfer to
areas lagging behind. The evidence in Vona, Marin, and Consoli (2018b) suggests that this is the case, as the
areas creating more green jobs also tend to host high-tech industries and national research laboratories.
Such persistence is not surprising because technological transitions take time, and are characterized by positive
feedback loops from the implementation of a coherent set of climate and social policies that enhance support
for such policies (Rosemberg, 2010).
An alternative plan, which has worked particularly well in Canada, is to recycle the revenues from a carbon tax
to reduce labour taxation (e.g. Yamazaki, 2017). Although this tax reform may not prevent the relocation of pol-
luting industries or parts of such industries elsewhere, reducing labour taxation enhances the incentives to
create jobs in other sectors. The main disadvantage of this solution is that, without industrial policy to create
a comparative advantage in green sectors and thus high-quality green jobs, the new jobs may be created in
the low-skill segments of the service sectors where salaries are lower than in old jobs. As a result, the political
discontent caused by climate policies will not be mitigated. Against this background, a more general issue is
how to address the pronounced skill-biased eﬀects of recent labour market transformations, which call for
active redistributive policies both at the national and at the international level. Fighting climate change will
be diﬃcult in the years to come without a serious plan to reduce within-country inequality in the distribution
of the fruits of economic growth.
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Notes
1. BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
2. The eﬀect of automation and of the diﬀusion of information and communication technologies in the workplace are clearly far
larger than those of climate policies, as these technologies have potential applications in all sectors. In turn, climate policies
directly aﬀect production processes in a set of sectors that represent a signiﬁcantly smaller share of total employment (basi-
cally manufacturing and energy) in nowadays developed economies.
3. This ﬁnding is consistent with that of the literature on the so-called pollution haven hypothesis, pointing to a modest eﬀect of
asymmetric environmental policies on foreign direct investment and industrial relocation (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017).
4. Similar evidence is available for emerging eastern European economies (Politico, 2016) and Australia (Mathys & de Melo, 2011).
In their congresses, both the International Transport workers’ Federation (ITF) and the International Federation of Chemical,
Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM) explicitly stated that climate policies should be implemented in such a
way to protect jobs through a process of just transition (Rosemberg, 2010). Other interesting cases studies of distributional
impacts and their political consequences are in Sovacool, Linnér, and Goodsite (2015).
5. Automation is less problematic as an ampliﬁer of the “job killing” argument because it is not policy-driven. Technological
choices of companies are not subject to regulation in the same way as the choice to export or to shift dirtier segments of pro-
duction abroad.
6. The lack of industrial diversiﬁcation is also a well-known determinant of the so-called natural resource curse associated with
the exploitation of exhaustible resources (Van der Ploeg, 2011).
7. While the International Labour Organization plays a key role in promoting sustainable growth, we saw in Section 3 that wea-
kened national unions rarely have the bargaining power to actively negotiate greener investment strategies with multinational
and local ﬁrms.
8. Trade policies are nested in a more comprehensive and binding legal framework than climate policies.
9. Public sector investments and long-term planning promoting industry diversiﬁcation and learning represent two related
factors that ensured a successful transition in the Ruhr region (e.g., Taylor, 2015; Thimm, 2010).
10. Caldecott et al. (2017) report that 30–40% Polish coal miners were unemployed or out of the labour force two years after
displacement
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